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Introduction
One of the most well-known models of non-expected utility preferences is Gul (1991) 's model of Disappointment Aversion (henceforth DA). Its popularity is related both to the intuitive nature of the model, where the value of each outcome is determined relatively to an endogenously-defined "expected" payoff, capturing reference dependence; and because it generalizes expected utility by adding only one parameter. Despite its appeal, there is one limitation to its applicability: the value of each lottery is the solution of an equation that changes with the lottery-a so-called implicit representation. The (explicit) utility representation is instead unknown. This may be a concern if one wishes to apply this model, for example, to carry out monotone comparative statics exercises. The same concern applies to the broader class of Betweenness preferences, studied in Dekel (1986) and Chew (1989) and to which the DA model belongs; for such preferences only an implicit representation is known, while the explicit one is still elusive. 1 The goal of this paper is to address these issues. First, we provide an explicit representation for DA preferences, showing that it can be easily obtained using solely the components of its implicit one. Second, we generalize this result: we provide an explicit representation for Betweenness preferences that satisfy either Negative Certainty Independence (Dillenberger, 2010; Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2015) , or its positive version, Positive Certainty Independence. Third, we show how our approach may be useful to identify parameters of the model and in comparative statics exercises.
Let p be a lottery over monetary outcomes. Its value according to the DA model is the unique v that solves
where k v is given by
Here u is a utility function over money and β ∈ (−1, ∞) is the coefficient of either disappointment aversion (β > 0) or elation seeking (β < 0). Note that this is an implicit equation, as the value v appears on both sides of Equation (1). In this model the value v is similar to expected utility, except that the individual gives an additional weight β to disappointing outcomes-those with a utility lower than the value of the lottery itself. 2 The DA model is thus a model of endogenous reference dependence: possible payoffs generate disappointment (or elation) depending on how their utilities 1 This is the case not only for the broad class, but also for most of its special cases. A notable exception is Chew and MacCrimmon (1979a,b) 's model of weighted-utility. 2 To see this, note that the value of a simple lottery p can be equivalently defined as the unique v compare to an endogenously-determined value-the utility of the lottery. 3 When β > 0, the disappointing outcomes receive greater weight, whereas the opposite is true for β < 0, justifying the terms disappointment aversion/elation seeking. If β = 0, the model reduces to expected utility. In Section 3 we show that these preferences admit the following explicit representation. When β > 0, the case of disappointment aversion, preferences are represented by
while when β ∈ (−1, 0), the case of elation seeking, they are represented by
This means that one can easily construct an explicit representation for preferences in this class using solely the components of the implicit representation in Equation (1)taking the min or the max of the certainty equivalents computed using each of the possible utilities involved. After formally stating the result above for DA preferences (Theorem 3), we discuss an explicit representation for general Betweenness preferences that also satisfy Negative Certainty Independence (Theorem 4), or its counterpart (Positive Certainty Independence). The previous results are corollaries of this more general theorem. Again, the explicit representation is the minimum (resp., maximum) of the certainty equivalents using the functions (called local utilities) present in Dekel (1986) 's implicit representation.
There are at least two benefits of having an explicit representation. The first is conceptual: it may help capturing the mental process adopted by the agent. While highly idealized, one can imagine a cautious decision process that involves the max min criterion. It is perhaps less plausible to take the solution of an implicit equation as a descriptive decision making procedure. That said, this argument is not behavioral, but relies on going beyond the standard 'as if' approach. 4 The second and possibly main advantage of an explicit representation is practical: it facilitates the application of these models by allowing for a better understanding 3 We should stress that this is conceptually and behaviorally distinct from other models of endogenous reference dependence under risk, e.g., Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) . For example, the DA model satisfies Betweenness, while both models above do not. See Masatlioglu and Raymond (2016) for further discussion on the implications of these alternative models. 4 A related argument appears in Chapter 17 of Gilboa (2009) and in Dekel and Lipman (2010) .
of optimization problems with these preferences. This is particularly relevant because DA preferences, while continuous, are not even Gateaux differentiable (Safra and Segal, 2009 ). Therefore, one cannot apply standard differential methods or Machina (1982) 's local utility approach and its extensions to the Gateaux case.
In Section 4 we start demonstrating the practical benefit of our approach, by showing that it can be useful to identify the parameters of DA preferences from behavior: while it is known that both u and β are unique (the former up to positive affine transformations), using the original implicit representation it is not easy to see how to easily pin-point them from behavioral data. Our approach, instead, offers a way to do so directly, identifying u independently of β.
With this identification in hand, in Section 5 we discuss optimization and applications. Using Sion's minmax theorem in conjunction with our characterizations, we show that the solution to a maximization problem over a convex and compact set of options with DA preferences must coincide with the solution of the original problem under expected utility, but with the agent being more risk averse. The key point is not that disappointment aversion increases risk aversion, but rather that the solution under disappointment aversion must also be a solution under expected utility, with a more concave utility. That is, solving the problem under disappointment aversion is tantamount to solving it with expected utility with higher risk aversion. As the latter is typically easier to solve, this may greatly simplify the problem when it comes to comparative statics.
We illustrate the usefulness of this result with a variety of applications. We show that, in a standard portfolio problem, a disappointment averse agent invests less in the risky asset compared to an expected utility agent with the same utility over outcomes; that the set of justifiable actions in general, and rationalizable strategies in a game in particular, is smaller if we make agents elation seeking; and that in a simple problem of Bayesian Persuasion, making the sender of information disappointment averse reduces the revealed information.
Preliminaries
Consider a nontrivial compact interval [w, b] ⊆ R of monetary prizes. Let ∆ be the set of lotteries (Borel probability measures) over [w, b] , endowed with the topology of weak convergence. We denote by x, y, z generic elements of [w, b] ; by p, q, r generic elements of ∆; and by δ x ∈ ∆ the degenerate lottery (Dirac measure at x) that gives the prize x ∈ [w, b] with certainty. We denote by C ([w, b]) the space of continuous functions on [w, b] and endow it with the topology induced by the supnorm. The set
is the collection of all strictly increasing and continuous functions v : [w, b] → R such that v (w) = 0 and v (b) = 1. Given p ∈ ∆ and a strictly increasing
The primitive of our analysis is a binary relation over ∆. The symmetric and asymmetric parts of are denoted by ∼ and, respectively, . A certainty equivalent of a lottery p ∈ ∆ is a prize x p ∈ [w, b] such that δ xp ∼ p. Throughout the paper, we focus on binary relations that satisfy the following three standard assumptions.
A 1 (Weak Order) The relation is complete and transitive.
A 2 (Continuity) For each q ∈ ∆, the sets {p ∈ ∆ : p q} and {p ∈ ∆ : q p} are closed.
Betweenness Preferences. We study binary relations that satisfy the following assumption:
Betweenness implies neutrality toward mixing: if satisfied, then the agent has no preference for, or aversion to, mixing between indifferent lotteries. Binary relations satisfying this property were studied by Dekel (1986) and Chew (1989) .
We say that a binary relation is a Betweenness preference if and only if it satisfies Weak Order, Continuity, Strict First Order Stochastic Dominance, and Betweenness. Dekel (1986) proves a version of the following result: 5 Theorem 1 (Dekel, 1986) If is a Betweenness preference, then there exists a function k : [w, b] × [0, 1] → R such that: 5 Dekel's original result deals with a general set of consequences and considers a weaker form of monotonicity. At the same time, it uses a stronger form of Betweenness. Given these differences, we prove Theorem 1 in Appendix A. For convenience, we focus on the normalized representation (that is, k satisfies the condition in point 3). In Remark 4 in Appendix A we comment on how to use our results for unnormalized representations. Also observe that even though k (·, 0) and k (·, 1) are not assumed to be continuous, they are implicitly assumed to be integrable, given Equation (2) in the representation.
1. x → k (x, t) is strictly increasing and continuous on [w, b] for all t ∈ (0, 1),
4.
can be represented by a continuous utility function which strictly preserves first order stochastic dominance,V : ∆ → [0, 1], where for each p ∈ ∆,V (p) is the unique number in [0, 1] such that [w,b] k x,V (p) dp =V (p) .
(2)
Fixing t, the function k (·, t) is called the local utility at t. The function k thus summarizes the collection of local utilities, one for each t ∈ [0, 1]. While the theorem above provides a representation for Betweenness preferences, it does not provide an explicit one: indeed,V is the solution to Equation (2), thus a fixed point of a functional equation.
An important class of Betweenness preferences is the one generated by Gul (1991) 's model of Disappointment Aversion (DA). These preferences admit a continuous utility functionṼ : ∆ → R such that, for each p ∈ ∆,Ṽ (p) is the unique number that solves [w,b]k x,Ṽ (p) dp =Ṽ (p)
wherek :
here u is a strictly increasing continuous utility function from [w, b] to R and β ∈ (−1, ∞). 6 We discussed its interpretation in the Introduction. We say that a binary relation is a DA preference with parameters (u, β) if and only if it admits a utility functionṼ which satisfies (3).
Negative Certainty Independence. As noted by Dillenberger (2010) , a DA preference with β > 0 satisfies the following axiom.
6 A careful inspection of (4) also suggests that two types of normalizations are due to link the implicit representation of Gul (1991) to the one of Dekel (1986) as in Theorem 1. In proving our results below, we also address these minor technical points (see Remark 4) .
Negative Certainty Independence, initially suggested by Dillenberger (2010) , is meant to capture the certainty effect. It states that if the sure outcome x is not enough to compensate the agent for the risky prospect p, then mixing it with any other lottery, thus eliminating its certainty appeal, will not result in the mixture of δ x being more attractive than the corresponding mixture of p. The opposite condition, termed Positive Certainty Independence, simply inverts the role of p and δ x in (5).
We say that a binary relation is a Cautious Expected Utility preference if and only if it satisfies Weak Order, Continuity, Strict First Order Stochastic Dominance, and Negative Certainty Independence. Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015) prove the following: 7
Theorem 2 (Cerreia-Vioglio, Dillenberger, Ortoleva, 2015) If is a Cautious Expected Utility preference, then there exists W ⊆ U nor such that V :
is a continuous utility representation of .
Explicit representations
We start by providing an explicit representation of DA preferences.
Theorem 3 Let be a DA preference with parameters (u, β) and W da = k (·, z) z∈Im u . The following statements are true:
2. If β = 0, then V : ∆ → R, defined by
3. If β < 0, then V : ∆ → R, defined by
is a continuous utility representation of . In the case of disappointment aversion (β > 0), our utility representation is the smallest of the certainty equivalents obtained using the local utilities. In the opposite case of elation seeking (β < 0), it is instead the largest. Thus, the difference between the two behaviors is not only in the way in which disappointing/elating outcomes are weighted, but also in how they are aggregated-using the min or the max.
As discussed above, when β > 0, Gul's model satisfies Negative Certainty Independence. We thus know that it must admit a Cautious Expected Utility representation. However, from previous results we do not know which utilities are used. The content of Theorem 3 is to show that this involves precisely the local utilities used in the implicit representation. Thus, the explicit representation can be derived directly from the implicit one. When β < 0, the model does not satisfy Negative Certainty Independence, but its counterpart Positive Certainty Independence (Artstein-Avidan and . In this case the individual is elation seeking, and violates expected utility in a way opposite to the certainty effect.
A General Result. We now generalize Theorem 3 showing that any Betweenness preference that satisfies Negative Certainty Independence also admits an explicit representation of the Cautious Expected Utility form, where the utilities in W are the local ones obtained in Theorem 1, that is, W bet = {k (·, t)} t∈(0,1) .
Theorem 4 Let
be a Betweenness preference. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) satisfies Negative Certainty Independence;
(ii) The functional V : ∆ → R, defined by
is a continuous utility representation of . In particular, for each
Like in the case of the previous result, the contribution of Theorem 4 does not lie in showing that these preferences admit an explicit representation of the Cautious Expected Utility class-this was already known (it follows from Theorem 2). As before, the contribution lies in showing that the utilities involved are exactly the local utilities identified in Theorem 1 and included in W bet . Here too, the explicit representation can be derived directly from the implicit one. In addition, Equation (10) shows that the local utility giving the implicit representation of Dekel (1986) is also the one achieving the minimum in representation (9).
Remark 1 A specular version of this theorem also holds for Positive Certainty Independence. In particular, by keeping the same premises, Theorem 4 takes a similar form with (i) and (ii) replaced by:
satisfies Positive Certainty Independence;
(ii)' The functional V : ∆ → R, defined by
While Theorem 4 provides an explicit characterization for Betweenness preferences that satisfy Negative Certainty Independence, a natural question is how to check if a given Betweenness preference satisfies Negative Certainty Independence. In Appendix B we show how this could be easily done using only the properties of the local utilities. This result allows us to derive an example of a Betweenness preference that satisfies Negative Certainty Independence, but does not belong to the class of DA preferences.
Example 1 Consider a Betweenness preference with local utilities k :
This is a special case of Chew (1985) 's model of semi-implicit weighted utility, where [w, b] is set to be equal to [0, 1] . It retains the idea of disappointment aversion, but allows the weight, x − t, to depend on x. In Appendix B we show that this preference relation satisfies Negative Certainty Independence and therefore admits an explicit representation as in Theorem 4 with the utilities above.
Behavioral identification of parameters
Even though in the DA model both the utility function u and the disappointment aversion parameter β are unique (the former up to positive affine transformations), we are not aware of simple ways of identifying them from behavior. We now use our approach to derive an identification technique, as well as a behavioral notion of comparative disappointment aversion.
The expected utility core. In what follows it will be useful to recall the notion of expected utility core of a preference relation , i.e., the subrelation defined as
That is, p q if not only p is preferred to q, but this ranking is preserved even if both are mixed with another lottery. Under expected utility, we have = ; however, in general the two may not coincide and, in this case, is incomplete. This notion is central in proving our main results above and in the study of Cautious Expected Utility preferences. 8 We now show that it is also useful for the identification of the parameters characterizing a DA preference.
Behavioral identification of parameters. We begin by recalling how identification works under expected utility. Consider an expected utility agent with a continuous and strictly increasing von Neumann-Morgenstern utility u. If we normalize u(b) = 1 and u(w) = 0, it is known that for each
That is, when u is normalized, the utility of x is equal to the highest of the weights λ that, if given to the best prize, keeps δ x preferred to λδ b + (1 − λ)δ w . Because under expected utility coincides with , this can be equivalently stated as
We now show that for a DA preference with parameters (u, β) , where and cease to coincide whenever β = 0, it is this latter formula that allows us to identify the utility u independently from β. Before stating our result, recall that two von Neumann-Morgenstern functions u,ū ∈ C ([w, b]) are cardinally equivalent if and only if u = aū+b where a > 0 and b ∈ R. It is easy to see that if (u, β) represents a DA preference , so does (ū, β) , provided u andū are cardinally equivalent. Recall that given a lottery p and a preference relation , we denote by x p the certainty equivalent of p.
Proposition 1 Let be a DA preference with parameters (u, β) . The following statements are true:
1. If β ≥ 0, then u is cardinally equivalent tō
and if we definep = 1 2 δ b + 1 2 δ w , then the exact value of β is
2. If β ≤ 0, then u is cardinally equivalent tō
To distinguish behaviorally between the two cases above, i.e., β ≥ 0 (resp., β ≤ 0), recall that by Theorem 3 they correspond to Negative (resp., Positive) Certainty Independence.
Moreover, in both cases above the value of β can be determined using any binary lottery between the best and the worst outcomes-not justp. This is because, for a DA preference with parameters (u, β) 
Comparative Disappointment Aversion. The result above also allows us to derive simple comparative statics, showing how to behaviorally identify when one agent is more disappointment averse than the other, i.e., has higher β fixing the utility function u.
Proposition 2 Let 1 and 2 be two DA preferences with parameters (u 1 , β 1 ) and (u 2 , β 2 ) , with β 1 , β 2 ≥ 0. The following statements are equivalent:
In words, an agent is more disappointment averse than the other, if the two agents have the same risk attitudes in terms of the expected utility core, but the first agent is more risk averse than the second in terms of final choices. Now that we understand the behavioral meaning of comparing two agents with identical u solely in terms of their coefficient β, we can proceed to illustrate how our explicit representations can be used to provide comparative statics results in applications.
Optimization and applications 5.1 Explicit representations and optimization
Typically in economic models, agents need to pick the best action from a convex and compact set of alternatives. However, explicitly solving such problems with Betweenness preferences or even just obtaining qualitative predictions, can be nontrivial: as pointed out in the introduction, standard differential methods cannot be used, as DA preferences are not even Gateaux differentiable. We now show how our explicit representation results might help.
Consider a Betweenness preference that satisfies Negative Certainty Independencefor DA preferences, this corresponds to the typical case of β ≥ 0. By Theorem 4, is represented by
where W bet = {k (·, t)} t∈(0,1) . We further assume:
Note that both assumptions are satisfied by DA preferences as well as the preferences in Example 1 (see also Remark 4 in Appendix A).
Proposition 3 Let
be a Betweenness preference that satisfies Negative Certainty Independence and such that k satisfies (a) and (b). If A ⊆ ∆ is convex and compact, then max
Proposition 3 shows that any alternative that maximizes the original preference in A is also a maximizer of an expected utility preference with von Neumann-Morgenstern utilityv which is a convex combination of the utilities in W bet . Note that this result was derived exploiting the explicit representation in (13). This result holds because the map (p, v) → c (p, v) satisfies all the conditions of Sion's minmax theorem and so do the sets A and co (W bet ), leading to the equality in Proposition 3 and the existence of a saddle point.
To see the usefulness of this result, consider a maximization problem of the form
where V : ∆ → R is continuous and represents the agent's preferences. For simplicity, assume also it admits a unique maximizer. As it is often the case, assume that V has been first considered to be an expected utility functional with a strictly increasing and continuous von Neumann-Morgenstern function u, and call p * EU the solution of (14). Now suppose that we are interested in knowing what happens when agents are instead disappointment averse (β > 0), and call p * DA the solution for this case. How do the predictions of the model change? Proposition 3 simplifies answering this question. It shows that p * DA must also be the solution of the same optimization problem, but for an expected utility agent with von Neumann-Morgenstern functionv ∈ co (W bet ). It follows from the shape of the functions in W bet that each v ∈ co (W bet ) is more concave than u, which is easy to see because our characterization theorems give a precise functional form to these functions. Therefore, the solution to the problem with a DA preference must coincide with the solution of the original problem under expected utility, but with the agent being more risk averse. This means that monotone comparative statics exercises in terms of introducing disappointment aversion are equivalent to ones under expected utility in terms of concavity of u. As the latter are typically easier to solve, or at least use more familiar techniques, this may simplify the problem. The conceptual contribution here does not lie in showing that introducing disappointment aversion increases risk aversion-this is already well-known (Gul, 1991) . Rather, it lies in showing that the solution under disappointment aversion must also be a solution under expected utility with a more risk averse agent.
Remark 2 In the optimization problem above, alternatives are lotteries and agents' preferences are over ∆. A different common formalization of the problem in (14) is instead the following: the agent chooses an action from a set A, a state of the world from a state space S realizes, and the decision maker receives a monetary outcome specified by the function g : A × S → R. Suppose A and S are separable metric spaces where the latter is endowed with the Borel σ-algebra. Also assume that g is measurable with respect to s and bounded, i.e., Im g ⊆ [w, b]. The decision maker has a Borel probability measure µ over S and preferences over ∆, represented by the function V : ∆ → R. Each action a thus induces a probability measure over [w, b] ,
We assume that the agent is probabilistically sophisticated: given a belief µ on S, she values each action solely in terms of its distribution over payoffs, that is, if a, b ∈ A are such that p a,µ = p b,µ , then the agent is indifferent between a and b. Problem (14) then becomes max V (p a,µ ) subject to a ∈ A.
In Appendix A, we show that a result similar to Proposition 3 also holds in this setting with an identical conceptual interpretation (cf. Propositions 8 and 9).
Applications
We now present a list of applications of our previous results. The common feature is that they almost all follow rather immediately from a combination of our comparative statics and known results in the literature. This is because we have proved that introducing disappointment aversion yields the same monotone comparative statics of increasing risk aversion within expected utility.
Portfolio choice. Consider a standard two assets portfolio problem a la Arrow (noting we are in the framework of Remark 2). The risky asset r : S → [0, ∞) is a simple nonconstant measurable random variable which pays a return r (s) if state s realizes. The risk free asset is instead a constant random variable r f : S → [0, ∞). To avoid trivial cases, assume that E µ (r) > r f . A decision maker has wealth W > 0 which she has to allocate between r and r f . Denote by a and W − a the amounts invested, respectively, in the risky and the risk-free assets. Assume short-selling and borrowing are not allowed, which implies
for all a ∈ A and for all s ∈ S. Denote by a * EU the optimal allocation of a decision maker with expected utility preferences (β = 0) and a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility u such that u > 0 and u < 0. Denote by a * DA the optimal allocation of a disappointment averse agent (β > 0) with the same u. It is easy to show that both solutions are unique.
Corollary 1 a * DA ≤ a * EU .
Recall that, under expected utility, increasing risk aversion reduces the absolute investment in the risky asset. Since we have shown that the same comparative statics holds if we make the agent disappointment averse, the result that disappointment averse decision makers invest less in the risky asset follows.
Justifiability and rationalizability. A decision maker chooses an action a ∈ A without knowing which state of the world s ∈ S will realize and receives a monetary payoff g (a, s) (again, we are in the framework of Remark 2). Denote by ∆ (S) the set of Borel probability measures on S.
The set of justifiable actions is the set of actions that are optimal for some belief µ. That is,
This set and the corresponding operator are commonly used in game theory to derive rationalizable strategies: at the initial iteration, A is the set of actions of player i and S = A −i is the profile of the opponents' actions. We are interested in: How is the set of justifiable actions affected by disappointment aversion? Denote by J DA and J EU , respectively, the set of justifiable actions of a DA agent with parameters (u, β) and that of an expected utility agent with utility u.
In words, making the agent elation seeking shrinks the set of justifiable actions. To see why, recall that it is known that increasing risk aversion increases the set of justifiable actions (Battigalli et al., 2016; Weinstein, 2016) ; then the same comparative statics holds here, as moving from β = 0 to negative β decreases risk aversion.
The result above does not cover the case β > 0. To see why, note that the set of justifiable actions is a union of argmax sets (J V = ∪ µ∈∆(S) argmax a∈A V (p a,µ )), while our results for monotone comparative statics are in terms of argmax sets. By our maxmin results with DA preferences, we have that if either β > 0 or β < 0, then
But if β > 0, then each v is more risk averse than u and J u ⊆ J v for all v, and the same conclusion cannot be derived.
Bayesian persuasion. We now consider the implications of adding disappointment aversion to a problem of Bayesian persuasion. We focus on the special case studied in Dworczak and Martini (2019, Section VI.A). Sender and Receiver share a full-support prior r with continuous cdf and expectationμ on a state of the world x ∈ [0, 1]. Sender observes the state before Receiver's choice and chooses a disclosure policy, which she commits to before observing the state. Receiver chooses action e ∈ [0,ē] whereē ≤ 1. Following Dworczak and Martini (2019) , we focus on the case in which both Sender and Receiver's utility, u S and u R respectively, depend only on Receiver's posterior mean y and action e: u S (e, y) = (1 − σ)ey u R (y, e) = σye − e α where 0 < σ < 1 and α > 1.
In equilibrium, Sender's utility can be rewritten as
where e * (y) is Receiver's optimal action. 9 As standard in this literature, Sender's problem amounts to choosing a distribution over Receiver's posteriors; and since here only their mean matter, this simplifies to choosing a distribution over posterior means. Note that fully revealing the state corresponds to generating a distribution of posterior means equal to r; while revealing less information implies a disclosure policy p of which r is a mean preserving spread-denote this by p ≥ MPS r. 10 Sender's problem thus corresponds to choosing a distribution from the set A = {p ∈ ∆ : p ≥ MPS r}.
We now compare two cases: when Sender follows expected utility with utility as in (16); and when Sender is disappointment averse with u as in (16) and β > 0. Denote by p * EU and p * DA the optimal disclosure policy in each of the two cases (p * EU is the solution computed by Dworczak and Martini 2019; see also the proof of Proposition 4). To make the problem interesting, we assume 0 <μ <ȳ < 1, whereȳ is the smallest posterior mean for which Receiver chooses the maximum actionē. 11
If Sender is disappointment averse, then it is optimal to reveal less information than the case of expected utility. Intuitively, the more information is transmitted, the more variation is in Receiver's action. Disappointment aversion increases Sender's desire to avoid this volatility and thus to communicate less information.
Appendix
In Appendix A, we provide the proofs of all the results in the paper. In Appendix B, we give a condition that allows to check whether or not a given Betweenness preference satisfies Negative Certainty Independence. This condition is instrumental in proving the statement contained in Example 1.
A Proofs
Roadmap. We begin by proving Theorem 1, a mildly modified version of Dekel's representation result. We proceed by recalling the notion of expected utility core and its role for Cautious Expected Utility preferences (Formula (19) and Remark 3). Using it, we characterize the expected utility core of Betweenness preferences (Propositions 5-7). These allow us to prove our most general representation result, Theorem 4 (resp., Remark 1). We then focus our attention to DA preferences. First, we discuss the issue of renormalization of Gul's locals (Remark 4); with this in mind, we prove Theorem 3 as a special case of Theorem 4. We then move to the proofs of our identification results (Propositions 1 and 2). Finally, we prove our maxmin result (Proposition 3) which allows us to discuss some monotone comparative statics applications. Proof of Theorem 1. Compared to (Dekel, 1986 , Proposition 2), we only need to prove that the following form of Betweenness holds p q =⇒ p λp + (1 − λ)∀λ ∈ (0, 1) and p q =⇒ p λp + (1 − λ)∀λ ∈ (0, 1) .
The proof of the first implication is routine (see, e.g., the techniques in (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2011, Lemma 56)). As for the second, suppose p q. By the first implication, we have that p λp + (1 − λ)for all λ ∈ (0, 1). By contradiction, assume that there existsλ ∈ (0, 1) such that p ∼λp + 1 −λ q. We have two cases: 1. p = δ b . Since p q, we obtain that δ b = p = q, yielding that p F SDλ p + 1 −λ q. Since satisfies Strict First Order Stochastic Dominance, we can conclude that p λ p + 1 −λ q, a contradiction.
2. p = δ b . Since satisfies Betweenness, it follows that
Since satisfies Strict First Order Stochastic Dominance, we have that γp + (1 − γ) δ b p for all γ ∈ (0, 1). By (17) and since satisfies Strict First Order Stochastic Dominance, we can conclude that
Next, we are going to define an ancillary object r η,γ = η (γp + (1 − γ)δ b )+(1−η)q for all η, γ ∈ (0, 1). Note that for each η, γ ∈ (0, 1) and for each λ ∈ λ , 1 ⊆ (0, 1), we have that
Since γp + (1 − γ)δ b p q for all γ ∈ (0, 1) and satisfies Continuity, for each γ ∈ (0, 1) there existsη γ ∈ (0, 1) such that rη γ ,γ =η γ (γp
Since satisfies Betweenness, λp + (1 − λ) rη γ ,γ ∼ p for all λ ∈ λ , 1 and for all γ ∈ (0, 1). Fix a generic γ ∈ (0, 1). Choose λ ∈ λ , 1 close enough to 1, so
By the characterization of λp + (1 − λ) rη γ ,γ , we can also conclude that
By (17) and (18), we can conclude thatλ ∈ λ , 1 ,
Since satisfies Strict First Order Stochastic Dominance, it follows thatλp + 1 −λ r λ p + 1 −λ q, a contradiction. A similar proof yields that λp +
(1 − λ)for all λ ∈ (0, 1).
We recall the definition of expected utility core of , i.e., the subrelation defined as:
This notion is useful for three reasons. First, as Remark 3 below shows, in order to find a (canonical) representation of a Cautious Expected Utility preference, it is sufficient to find an expected multi-utility representation of . This is instrumental in proving Theorem 4 (cf. Proposition 7). Second, allows to retrieve the parameters characterizing a DA preference from behavioral data (cf. Propositions 1 and 2). Third, as shown by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2017) , in general summarizes the risk attitudes of the decision maker irrespective of whether or not satisfies Negative Certainty Independence. In particular, is averse to Mean Preserving Spreads if and only if is, which is equivalent to have all the utilities representing the latter being concave.
Remark 3
In addition to what is stated in Theorem 2, it can also be shown that the following are true:
1. There exists a set W ⊆ U nor such that
and V : ∆ → R defined as in Equation (6) is a continuous utility representation of .
2. If W ⊆ U nor satisfies (20), then it satisfies (6).
3. The set W ⊆ U nor can be chosen to be
4. If W ⊆ U nor satisfies (20), then W ⊆ W max − nor as well as co (W) = cl (W max − nor ) .
In particular, this latter result, paired with point 2, allows us to discuss uniqueness of the representation in (6). In fact, a canonical representation W, that is a set in U nor that also represents , represents and is unique up to the closed convex hull.
We next prove a few results pertaining to the expected utility core of a Betweenness preference. These results rely on some of the techniques developed in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2017) . We start with a definition and an observation. Define K : ∆ × [0, 1] → R by K (r, t) = [w,b] k (x, t) dr ∀r ∈ ∆, ∀t ∈ [0, 1] .
It is immediate to see that K is affine wrt the first component. Note that for each r ∈ ∆ and for each t ∈ [0, 1]
Finally, we have that for each p ∈ ∆ the numberV (p) ∈ [0, 1] is the unique number such thatV (p) = K p,V (p) .
Proposition 5 Let be a Betweenness preference. If K (p, t) ≥ K (q, t) for all t ∈ (0, 1), then p q.
Proof. Consider p, q ∈ ∆. By contradiction, assume that K (p, t) ≥ K (q, t) for all t ∈ (0, 1) and q p. We have two cases: either q = δ b or q = δ b . In the first case, note that 1 ≥ K (p, t) ≥ K (q, t) = 1 for all t ∈ (0, 1), that is, K (p, t) = 1 for all t ∈ (0, 1). Since each k (·, t) is strictly increasing and normalized, we can conclude that p = δ b = q, a contradiction with q p. In the second case, we have thatV (q) ∈ (0, 1). On the one hand, since admits a representation a la Dekel, note that
On the other hand, by working hypothesis, we have q p which implies thatV (q) > V (p). It follows that
In particular, it follows that
Define r =V (p) δ b + 1 −V (p) δ w . By (21) and (23) and since K is affine wrt the first component, it follows that there exists λ ∈ (0, 1] such that
proving that λp + (1 − λ) r ∼ q. By (22), we have that r ∼ p. Since is a Betweenness preference, this yields that p ∼ λp + (1 − λ) r ∼ r. We can conclude that q p ∼ λp + (1 − λ) r ∼ q, a contradiction.
Proposition 6 Let be a Betweenness preference. If p q, then K (p, t) ≥ K (q, t) for all t ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Consider p, q ∈ ∆. By contradiction, assume that p q and that there exists t ∈ (0, 1) such that K (p,t) < K (q,t). Then, there exist λ ∈ (0, 1] and y ∈ [w, b] such thatV (λp + (1 − λ) δ y ) =t. 13 It follows that
Define r 1 = λp + (1 − λ) δ y and r 2 = λq + (1 − λ) δ y so thatt =V (r 1 ). In particular, we obtain thatV (r 1 ) < K r 2 ,V (r 1 ) .
Since p q and satisfies Independence, it follows that r 1 r 2 . Since is a subrelation of , this implies that r 1 r 2 , that is,V (r 1 ) ≥V (r 2 ). Define r 3 = V (r 2 ) δ b + 1 −V (r 2 ) δ w . On the one hand, it is immediate to see that r 2 ∼ r 3 . On the other hand, by (24), we obtain that K r 3 ,V (r 1 ) =V (r 2 ) ≤V (r 1 ) < K r 2 ,V (r 1 ) .
Since K is affine wrt the first component, there exists γ ∈ [0, 1) such that K γr 2 + (1 − γ) r 3 ,V (r 1 ) =V (r 1 ) , yielding that γr 2 + (1 − γ) r 3 ∼ r 1 . Since satisfies Betweenness and r 2 ∼ r 3 , this yields that r 2 ∼ γr 2 + (1 − γ) r 3 ∼ r 1 .
We can then conclude thatV (r 2 ) =V (r 1 ), that is,V (r 1 ) =V (r 2 ) = K r 2 ,V (r 2 ) = K r 2 ,V (r 1 ) , a contradiction with (24).
Proposition 7 If is a Betweenness preference, then
Moreover, the set W bet is either a singleton or infinite.
13 IfV (p) ≥t > 0 =V (δ w ), then y = w and ifV (p) <t < 1 =V (δ b ), then y = b. The existence of λ is then granted by the continuity ofV .
By Proposition 6, we have that if p q, then K (p, t) ≥ K (q, t) for all t ∈ (0, 1), that is, p q. By Proposition 5, if p q, that is K (p, t) ≥ K (q, t) for all t ∈ (0, 1), then p q. By (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2017, Lemma 1 and Footnote 10), we can conclude that p q implies p q, proving that coincides with . Finally, assume that W bet is not a singleton. It follows that there exist t 1 , t 2 ∈ (0, 1) andx ∈ (w, b) such that k (x, t 1 ) = k (x, t 2 ). Without loss of generality, assume that k (x, t 1 ) < k (x, t 2 ). By contradiction, assume that |W bet | ∈ N. By the intermediate value theorem and since k (x, ·) is continuous on (0, 1), it follows that
We now prove Theorem 4. Proof of Theorem 4. (ii) implies (i). By (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2015, Theorem 1), the statement trivially follows.
(i) implies (ii). Since is a Betweenness preference, it satisfies Weak Order, Continuity, and Strict First Order Stochastic Dominance. By Theorem 2 and Remark 3, and since W bet = {k (·, t)} t∈(0,1) represents , it follows that W in (6) can be chosen to be W bet . This yields (6) and, in particular, (9) with inf in place of min. Note that for each v ∈ W bet we have that V (δ w ) = w = c (δ w , v) and V (δ b ) = b = c (δ b , v). Thus the inf is attained for δ w and δ b . The proof below yields that the inf is attained at each p ∈ ∆, proving (9). We next prove (10). Consider p ∈ ∆\ {δ w , δ b }. Since satisfies Strict First Order Stochastic Dominance, we have thatV (p) ∈ (0, 1) and it is the unique number in [0, 1] such that [w,b] k x,V (p) dp =V (p) .
(25)
By (25), it follows that
Since is a Betweenness preference, we can conclude thatV (δx) =V (p), that is, δx ∼ p and sox = x p . 14 This yields that
proving that the inf is attained at v p .
Proof of Remark 1. (i)' implies (ii)'. Since satisfies Weak Order, Continuity, and Strict First Order Stochastic Dominance, there exists a continuous utility function b] . By Proposition 7, the expected utility core of admits an expected multi-utility representation with set W bet .
By Proposition 7, this yields that δV (p) p. Since is a subrelation of , we can conclude that δV (p) p, that is,V (p) = V δV (p) ≥ V (p), proving thatV ≥ V . By contradiction, assume thatV ≤ V . It would follow that there exists p ∈ ∆ such that V (p) > V (p). This would imply that there exists y ∈ [w, b] such thatV (p) > y > V (p). We could conclude that δ y p. By Proposition 7 and since satisfies Positive Certainty Independence, we could conclude that δ y p, that is, y = c (δ y , v) ≥ c (p, v) for all v ∈ W bet , yielding thatV (p) > y ≥ sup v∈W bet c (p, v) =V (p), a contradiction. This proves that
In order to prove that (12) and (11) hold, the same arguments used in proving (10) and (9) apply.
(ii)' implies (i)'. Consider x ∈ [w, b] and p, q ∈ ∆ as well as λ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that
proving that satisfies Positive Certainty Independence.
14 Recall that a Betweenness preference is a binary relation on ∆ which satisfies Weak Order, Continuity, Strict First Order Stochastic Dominance, and Betweenness. In this case, given p ∈ ∆, x p is the unique number such that δ xp ∼ p.
Remark 4
As already observed, a careful inspection of Gul's model formulation (see (4) ) suggests that two types of normalizations are due to link the implicit Gul's representation to Dekel's one. In order to do so, we define few objects: α :
We also set
and, since g is strictly increasing, continuous, and Im g = Im u = ImṼ ,
Finally, we set
It is easy to check that k andV satisfy all the assumptions of Theorem 1. 15 Since
and g : [0, 1] → Im u is strictly increasing, continuous, and onto, we have that for each t ∈ [0, 1] there exists an element z ∈ Im u such that k (·, t) is a positive affine transformation ofk (·, z). Similarly, for each z ∈ Im u there exists an element t ∈ [0, 1] such thatk (·, z) is a positive affine transformation of k (·, t). Recall that W da = k (·, z) z∈Im u
. In particular, this implies that inf v∈W bet c (p, v) = min v∈W da c (p, v) for all p ∈ ∆ as well as sup v∈W bet c (p, v) = max v∈W da c (p, v).
Proof of Theorem 3. 1 and 2. By Dillenberger (2010) and Artstein-Avidan and and since β ≥ 0, it follows that satisfies Negative Certainty Independence. By Theorem 4 and Remark 4, it follows that if β ≥ 0, then V :
is a continuous utility representation of where W bet = {k (·, t)} t∈(0,1) . Thus, if β > 0, then (7) follows. If β = 0, then W da = {u} and (8) follows.
3. By Dillenberger (2010) and Artstein-Avidan and and since β ∈ (−1, 0), it follows that satisfies Positive Certainty Independence. By Remarks 1 and 4, it follows that if β ∈ (−1, 0), then V : ∆ → R, defined by
∀p ∈ ∆ is a continuous utility representation of where W bet = {k (·, t)} t∈(0,1) .
We next prove our results on the behavioral identification of parameters for DA preferences. Proof of Proposition 1. Before starting, define byū the positive and affine transformation of u such thatū (w) = 0 andū (b) = 1. Recall that (ū, β) also represents . We denote by W da the corresponding set of local utilities given byk defined as in (4) and computed with (ū, β). By Proposition 7 and Remark 4, recall that is such that
We list four facts that are going to be useful:
1. For each v ∈ W da there exists a strictly increasing and continuous function f v :
1. By points 1 and 2 and since β ≥ 0, we have that if p ∈ ∆ and
By point 3, we have that
By (26) and (27) and sinceū (w) = 0 =ū (b) − 1, we can conclude that for each
By point 4, we conclude that
proving the statement.
2. By points 1 and 2 and since β ≤ 0, we have that if p ∈ ∆ and
By (26) and (28) and sinceū (w) = 0 =ū (b) − 1, we can conclude that for each
Proof of Proposition 2. We adopt the same normalizations and objects of Proposition 1. Since we have two preferences we index the corresponding objects by 1 and 2. Before starting, recall that V i : ∆ → R, defined by
(i) implies (ii). Sinceū 1 andū 2 are normalized and u 1 is cardinally equivalent to u 2 , we have thatū 1 =ū 2 . Defineū =ū 1 =ū 2 . By (26) and (27), we have that for each x ∈ [w, b] and for each p ∈ ∆
Since β 1 ≥ β 2 ≥ 0, for each v ∈ W 2 da there existsṽ ∈ W 1 da which is a strictly increasing, continuous, and concave transformation of v. This implies that
Since the functional on the left-hand (resp., right-hand) side represents 2 (resp., 1 ), it follows that for each x ∈ [w, b] and for each p ∈ ∆ δ x 2 p =⇒ δ x 1 p, proving the implication.
(ii) implies (i). By (26) and (27), we have that for each x ∈ [w, b] and for each
yielding thatū 1 is an affine transformation ofū 2 . Sinceū 1 andū 2 are normalized, it follows thatū 1 =ū 2 , in particular, proving that u 1 and u 2 are cardinally equivalent. Definep = 1 2 δ b + 1 2 δ w . Let x i,p be the certainty equivalent of i . Sinceū 1 is equal tō u 2 , letū =ū 1 =ū 2 . By Proposition 1 and its proof, we have that
Since 1 is more risk averse than 2 , we have that x 2,p ≥ x 1,p , that is, β 1 ≥ β 2 .
Proof of Proposition 3. Define W = co (W bet ). Given the assumptions, W is convex and compact and (13) ([w, b] ). This implies that the convex hull of W bet , co (W bet ), is bounded and equicontinuous. Since closure in supnorm preserves boundedness and equicontinuity, we can conclude that co (W bet ) = cl (co (W bet )) is a bounded and equicontinuous family of functions of C ([w, b]). By Arzela-Ascoli Theorem, co (W bet ) is compact. Finally, we are left to show that co (W bet ) is a subset of U nor . Clearly, each v ∈ co (W bet ) is continuous and such that v (w) = 0 and v (b) = 1. Thus, we only need to prove that v is strictly increasing. Let x, y ∈ [w, b] be such that x > y. Since k is strictly increasing in the first argument and continuous in the second, we have that there existst ∈ [0, 1] and ε > 0 such that
This implies that v (x) > v (y) for all v ∈ co (W bet ). Since x and y were arbitrarily chosen, this shows that each element of co (W bet ) is strictly increasing.
is quasiconcave and upper semicontinuous in the first argument and quasiconvex and lower semicontinuous in the second argument. By Sion's minimax theorem and since A is a convex and compact set of ∆, this implies that
Since max p∈A min v∈W c (p, v) = min v∈W max p∈A c (p, v), this yields that
We next move to the applications contained in Section 5.2. We begin by offering, in a framework action-space, two versions of Proposition 3. The first, for β > 0, is key to prove our result on portfolio choice. The second, for β < 0, is needed to prove our result on justifiability. We then discuss our Bayesian Persuasion application. This latter one is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.
and concave function f v : Im u → [0, 1] such that v = f v • u. By the Change of Variable Theorem, this implies that g (a, s) )) dµ ∀a ∈ A, ∀v ∈ W.
Since a → u (g (a, s) ) is concave for all s ∈ S, it follows that a → f v (u (g (a, s) )) is concave for all s ∈ S. This implies that a → c (p a,µ , v) is quasiconcave on A for all v ∈ W. It is immediate to verify that a → c (p a,µ , v) is upper semicontinuous on A for all v ∈ W. By standard arguments, it also follows that v → c (p a,µ , v) is quasiconvex and lower semicontinuous on W for all a ∈ A. By Sion's minimax theorem, this implies that max
Since max a∈A min v∈W c (p a,µ , v) = min v∈W max a∈A c (p a,µ , v), this yields that c (p a * ,µ ,v) = max a∈A c (p a,µ ,v) , proving the statement.
Proof of Corollary 1. First, observe that A = [0, W ] and g (a, s) = ar (s) + (W − a) r f (s) for all a ∈ A and for all s ∈ S. Clearly, A is a compact and convex subset of a separable normed vector space. Since r is measurable and r f is constant, s → g (a, s) is measurable for all a ∈ A. Finally, by construction, a → g (a, s) is continuous and affine for all s ∈ S. Since u < 0, u is concave and, in particular, a → u (g (a, s)) is continuous and concave for all s ∈ S. By Proposition 8, there existŝ v ∈ co (W bet ) such that E p a * DA ,µ (v) ≥ E pa,µ (v) for all a ∈ A. In other words, a * DA is the solution of the portfolio problem for a decision maker who is expected utility and more risk averse than u. It is well-known that this implies that a * DA ≤ a * EU .
Proposition 9 Consider the framework of Remark 2 and the problem in (15). If 1. is a DA preference with parameters (u, β) where β < 0;
2. a * ∈ A is such that V (p a * ,µ ) ≥ V (p a,µ ) for all a ∈ A;
then, there existsv ∈ W bet such that E p a * ,µ (v) ≥ E pa,µ (v) for all a ∈ A.
Proof. By Theorem 3 and Remark 4, we have that V (p a * ,µ ) = c (p a * ,µ ,v) for somê v ∈ W bet . By Theorem 3 and assumption, we have that
Proof of Corollary 2. Given a strictly increasing and continuous von Neumann-Morgenstern function v : [w, b] → R, we denote by J v the set of justifiable actions for the expected utility preference generated by v. If a ∈ J DA , then there exists µ ∈ ∆ (S) such that V (p a,µ ) ≥ V (p b,µ ) for all b ∈ A where V is the functional in point 3 of Theorem 3 (see also Remark 4) . By Proposition 9, we have that there existsv ∈ W bet such that c (p a,µ ,v) ≥ c (p b,µ ,v) for all b ∈ A, that is, a ∈ Jv. Since β < 0, we have that u is more risk averse thanv. By Battigalli et al. (2016) , this implies that Jv ⊆ J u = J EU . We can conclude that a ∈ J u = J EU . Since a was arbitrarily chosen, the statement follows. 
where A = {p ∈ ∆ : p ≥ MPS r}. Before starting, we need some notation. Given an element p ∈ ∆, we denote by F p : [0, 1] → [0, 1] the cumulative distribution of p, that is, F p (t) = p ([0, t]) for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Standard calculations show that in (16) we have e * (y) = min σy α 1 α−1 ,ē for all y ∈ [0, 1] andȳ = (α/σ)ē α−1 . Dworczak and Martini (2019, Proposition 3) prove that if e (r) =μ <ȳ, then a solution of (29) for the expected utility agent with u as in (16) 
where x is such that the probability s, defined by s (B) = r (B ∩ [x , 1]) /r ([x , 1]) for all B ∈ B, satisfies e (s) =ȳ. Define F DA = F p * DA where p * DA is a solution to (29). Finally, define U conc to be the set of all functions v : [0, 1] → R which are continuous and concave. We can begin.
Since A is compact and V is continuous, let p * DA be a solution of (29). By Proposition 3 and since A is convex, there existsv ∈ co (W bet ) such that
By contradiction, assume that p *
It is immediate to see that Φ DA and Φ EU are continuous functions. Since, by construction, p * EU , p * DA ≥ MPS r, we necessarily have that Φ DA (0) = Φ EU (0) as well as
Since p * DA ≥ MPS p * EU , this yields that there existst ∈ (0, 1) such that
Since p * DA ≥ MPS r and F EU (x) = F r (x) for all x ∈ [0, x ], we can conclude that
This implies thatt in (32) must belong to (x , 1). Since Φ DA and Φ EU are continuous as well as Φ DA (x ) ≤ Φ EU (x ) and Φ DA (t) > Φ EU (t) for somet ∈ (x , 1), we have that
is well defined. Note thatt >t ≥ x andt ≤ȳ. 18, 19 By (31), we have that
Otherwise,t ≤t. We have two cases:
1.t =t. In this case, we would have that
2.t <t. In this case, we would have that
Since Φ DA − Φ EU is a continuous function on [x ,t] , this would imply that there existst
that is,t ≤t <t ≤t, a contradiction. 19 By contradiction, assume thatt >ȳ. Since F EU is such that F EU (x) = 1 ≥ F DA (x) for all yielding that
Next, we show thatt can be chosen to beȳ. First, by (32) and since Φ DA t = Φ EU t , observe that
Since
a contradiction with (32).
By (33) and sincet can be chosen to beȳ, this yields that 
In particular, we would have that F DA (ȳ) = 1, a contradiction. ** y >ȳ. Since λ ∈ (0, 1) and e (q DA ) <ȳ < e (r DA ), consider ε, τ ∈ (0, min {λ, 1 − λ}) such that τ τ +ε e (q DA ) + ε τ +ε e (r DA ) =ȳ. It follows that (λ − τ ) , (1 − λ − ε) ∈ (0, 1). Consider the probabilitŷ
Since e τ τ +ε q DA + ε τ +ε r DA =ȳ, note that
This implies that
Ep Note also that supp q DA = {0}. 20 This implies that
Sincev is a continuous, strictly increasing, and concave transformation of u, we have that
We can conclude that
a contradiction with (30).
Cases * and ** prove the statement.
20 If supp q DA = {0}, there would exist k ∈ (0, 1) such that F DA (x) = k for all x ∈ [0,ȳ). In this case, note that F r (0) ≥ F DA (0). Otherwise, since F r is continuous, if F r (0) < F DA (0), then there would existx ∈ [0, 1] such that F r (x) < F DA (0) for all x ∈ [0,x]. It would follow that
B When do Betweenness preferences satisfy NCI?
While Theorem 4 provides an explicit characterization for Betweenness preferences that satisfy Negative Certainty Independence, a natural question is how to actually check if a given Betweenness preference does or does not satisfy Negative Certainty Independence. The next result, paired with the next remark, provides a rather simple tool to answer this question, solely in terms of the functional form of k. We conclude the appendix by illustrating its use, by proving the results in Example 1.
In stating these results, the following notation will be useful: given f : [0, 1] → [0, 1], we say that f is convex (resp., concave) at t ∈ (0, 1) if and only if for each n ∈ N,
For each s, t ∈ (0, 1), define f s,t to be the transformation from k (·, t) to k (·, s), that is, b] . Note that f s,t must exist since k (·, t) and k (·, s) are strictly increasing and continuous. Moreover, f s,t is strictly increasing, continuous, and such that f s,t (0) = 0 and f s,t (1) = 1.
Proposition 10 Let be a Betweenness preference. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) For each t ∈ (0, 1) and for each s ∈ (0, 1) the function f s,t is convex (resp., concave) at t;
(ii) satisfies Negative (resp., Positive) Certainty Independence.
Proposition 10 characterizes Negative Certainty Independence within the class of Betweenness preferences, just in terms of the parameters of their representation. In fact, testing Negative (resp., Positive) Certainty Independence amounts to checking if for each t ∈ (0, 1) the transformations f s,t are convex (resp., concave) at t for all s ∈ (0, 1). This is a handy tool since f s,t = k(·, s) • k −1 (·, t) and is thus computable. Moreover, checking convexity and concavity at t is rather simple in light of Remark 5 below.
Proof of Proposition 10. Before starting, define V : ∆ → R by V (p) = inf v∈W bet c (p, v) (resp., = sup v∈W bet c (p, v) ) ∀p ∈ ∆.
Define v t = k (·, t) for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Denote also by ∆ 0 the subset of ∆ of all simple lotteries (convex linear combinations of Dirac measures), that is, ∆ 0 = co {δ x } x∈ [w,b] .
Claim: If s, t ∈ (0, 1) and f s,t is convex (resp., concave) at t, then for each p ∈ ∆ 0 E p (v t ) = t =⇒ c (p, v t ) ≤ c (p, v s ) (resp., ≥ ).
Proof of the Claim. Let p ∈ ∆ 0 and E p (v t ) = t. If p = δ x , then the statement is trivially true, since c (p, v s ) = x = c (p, v t ). Otherwise, we have that there exist n ∈
Since f s,t is convex (resp., concave) at t, it follows that
Since v s = f s,t • v t , we have that f s,t = v s • v −1 t . This implies that c (p, v t ) ≤ c (p, v s ) (resp., ≥).
(i) implies (ii). Let p ∈ ∆\ {δ w , δ b }. Since satisfies Strict First Order Stochastic Dominance, we can conclude thatV (p) ∈ (0, 1) and it is the unique number in [0, 1] such that [w,b] k x,V (p) dp =V (p) .
Define t =V (p) and consider v t . Let also s be an element of (0, 1) and consider v s as well as f s,t . Since ∆ 0 is dense in ∆ and satisfies Weak Order, Continuity, and Strict First Order Stochastic Dominance, we have that there exists a sequence {p n } n∈N ⊆ ∆ 0 such that p n ∼ p for all n ∈ N and p n → p. The condition p n ∼ p yields that E pn (v t ) = t for all n ∈ N. By the previous claim and since {p n } n∈N ⊆ ∆ 0 and f s,t is convex (resp., concave) at t, this implies that c (p n , v t ) ≤ c (p n , v s ) (resp., ≥) for all n ∈ N. By passing to the limit and since s ∈ (0, 1) was arbitrarily chosen, we obtain that c (p, v t ) ≤ c (p, v s ) (resp., ≥ ) ∀s ∈ (0, 1) .
We can conclude that By using the same technique in the proof of (i) implies (ii) in Theorem 4, we have that x = c (p, v t ) is such that p ∼ δx, 21 that is,x = x p . Since p ∈ ∆\ {δ w , δ b } was arbitrarily chosen, we obtain that V (p) = x p for all p ∈ ∆. 22 This implies that V is a utility representation of . Since satisfies Continuity and V (δ x ) = x for all x ∈ [w, b], it is immediate to see that V is continuous. By Theorem 4 (resp., Remark 1), this implies that satisfies Negative Certainty Independence (resp., Positive Certainty Independence).
(ii) implies (i). By Theorem 4 (resp., Remark 1), we have that V : ∆ → R, 
is a continuous utility representation of . By contradiction, assume that there exist t ∈ (0, 1) and s ∈ (0, 1) such that f s ,t is not convex (resp., concave) at t. It follows that there exist n ∈ N\ {1}, {t i } n i=1 ⊆ [0, 1], and {λ i } n i=1 ⊆ [0, 1] such that n i=1 λ i = 1 and t = n i=1 λ i t i as well as f s ,t (t) > n i=1 λ i f s ,t (t i ) (resp., <).
Since is a Betweenness preference, this implies that p ∼ δx wherex = c (p, v t ). In particular, this implies that x p =x. At the same time, we also have that that [w,b] k x,V (p) dp =V (p) .
Recall also that v t = k ·,V (p) ∈ W bet and t =V (p). Definex ∈ [w, b] to be such thatx = c (p, v t ).
Note that
k x,V (p) dp = [w,b] k x,V (p) dp.
It follows that [w,b] k x,V (p) dδx = v t (x) =V (p) .
Since is a Betweenness preference, we can conclude thatV (δx) =V (p), that is, δx ∼ p and sō x = x p .
22 Clearly, V (δ x ) = x if either x = w or x = b.
(a) 0 ≤ t ≤ s. Note that g (0) = f (t) − mt ≤ f (t) − t = t 2 − st + s − t = (t − 1) (t − s) < 0.
(b) s < t ≤ t. Define h : [0, 1] → R by h (x) = x 2 − sx + s for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Note that h (t) = f (t) and h (t) = 2t − s ≤ m, yielding h (t) (t − t) ≥ m (t − t) for all t ≤ t. Since h is convex, we have that . It follows thath is concave. Note thath (t) = f (t) = g (t).
Sinceh is concave and g is affine, it is enough to verify thath (1) ≥ g (1) to prove that f (t ) =h (t ) ≥ g (t ) for all t ∈ [t, 1]. Since t ∈ (0, 1) and h (1) = 1, observe that if m = 2t − s, then g (1) = m (1 − t) + f (t) = (2t − s) (1 − t) + t 2 − st + s = 2t − 2t 2 − s + st + t 2 − st + s = 2t − t 2 = t + t (1 − t) ≤ 1 =h (1) .
Since 0 < s < t < 1, if m = 1, then g (1) −h (1) = g (1) − 1 = 1 − t + f (t) − 1 = 1 − t + t 2 − st + s − 1 = −t + t 2 − st + s = t (t − 1) + s (1 − t) = (t − s) (t − 1) < 0, proving that g (1) <h (1).
Subpoints a-c just showed that the subdifferential of f is nonempty at t and, in particular, f is convex at t.
t < s.
In this case, we have that for each x ∈ [0, 1]
